November 4, 2023

Across America, voters are being presented with proposals to allow for Ranked Choice Voting (RCV) in their jurisdictions. This election cycle, the City of Royal Oak, MI is one of them. Activists have been working hard to promote RCV in the city (to be initiated if ever approved by the state). This effort is indicative of what will no doubt become more common around the country (given that the same wealthy out-of-state donors and organizations providing funds for this campaign have done so elsewhere as well, including this effort in Massachusetts). You can find pro-RCV information specifically geared towards the Royal Oak, MI effort here, as well as information opposing RCV in Royal Oak here.

Whatever the jurisdiction, the arguments for and against RCV are usually similar everywhere with both sides citing alleged solutions and alleged problems RCV presents. This article focuses on one particular aspect of the debate: whether or not in the long run RCV has potential to allow for more candidates with good and unique ideas to get elected, or whether it may result in more pandering candidates promoting wishy-washy policy at the expense of more principled/passionate candidates. It appears the latter is more likely.

Why the effort and the hype?

The RCV concept, being a mere tool of a social choice process, is not inherently partisan or ideological. Nevertheless, partisan lines appear to be being drawn on the topic; those leaning Left are more likely to be in favor of the method, whereas Conservatives tend to view it with suspicion and oppose it (with some exceptions in both cases). Any such social choice process can have flaws and be subject to abuse. Ultimately the success or failure of any given system, measured by how well it facilitates the choices of citizens within an established political structure over time depends largely on the wisdom and vigilance of the citizens using it. We should not react too hastily to problems within established systems by completely changing them and hoping for a better result without considering the possibility that the new system may cause additional problems or be exploited in a manner similar to the old system. Likewise, we ought not outright reject new proposals without considering whether or not they may be improvements.

Arguably the biggest common gripe about current election processes (federal, state, and local) is that big money interests have a lock on the two party system and this makes it very difficult for outside candidates with new ideas to get nominated/elected and facilitate change. If a third party/independent candidate does make any headway with the electorate and they receive a sizeable chunk of support, they are often viewed as “spoilers” for one of the other candidates because there is an assumption that if their supporters did not “waste their vote” on the third party/independent candidate, they would have voted for the other major party candidate that lost. This makes voting for a third party/independent candidate understandably risky in the minds of many voters, especially with such a divided electorate.

There is certainly truth to this dynamic and this is a primary point RCV supporters cite in favor of their system, the assumption being that RCV makes voting for the third party/independent/less popular candidate easier and guilt free due to the fact that if that candidate fails, their second choice vote is still counted in the next round (and so on through the multiple rounds). Is this a true improvement and boon for third party/other candidates, or is it just an illusion prone to similar problems as our traditional system? Most of the time, if the above dynamic is true in a three-way race for example, a third party candidate will lose and their votes will simply be distributed out to the other candidates in proportions that reflect what voters would have chosen using the traditional method. This renders the RCV merely symbolic. In general, for a third party candidate to gain enough traction to be a threat to the nominees of the two parties in a ranked choice system, they must garner at least more first round votes than one of other major party candidates. If that defeated candidate’s second round votes propels the other major party candidate to victory, then just like before the RCV system functioned only as an outward projection of the internal decision-making every voter makes. If, on the other hand, the second round votes of a defeated major party candidate actually propels the third party candidate to victory, then RCV made a difference to the outcome, but that outcome is one in which the “majority” vote was accomplished via less than ideal circumstances. Indeed, any ranked choice outcome other than a first round plurality for one candidate could arguably be seen as a false majority.

The elected candidate did not, in such a scenario, likely win due to an outpouring of support for their principled stances, rather it is more likely they won because “they were better than the other guy” in the minds of enough voters. This mentality is actually very similar to that which RCV suggested was problematic in the first place; it is just the other side of the same coin. So in this scenario, the best case for RCV going more than one round is one in which a “good enough” candidate achieved victory. To some extent this is unavoidable, but is this “good enough” mentality one we wish to universalize with RCV? What would be the long term impact if this became the sought after position?

Part of a larger effort, presenting the same dangers

There are other aspects of voting reform that have been sought by certain interests that appear to be facilitating a similar “muddled-middle” outcome in the name of preventing undesirable practices in the current system. One of them is the war on gerrymandering, which has seen the rise of “independent redistricting committees” proposed as a solution. Fittingly, this was accomplished in Michigan in 2018 as well. This parallel effort is worth reviewing to understand how unpopular concepts (gerrymandering) can be exploited using popular sentiment to facilitate change that essentially does the same thing while creating new risks and potential problems along the way.

Activists, including outside monied interests, were successful in their attempt to amend Article IV, Section 6 of the Constitution of Michigan to allow for an “independent” citizens redistricting commission for state legislative and congressional districts. Just like advocates for Ranked Choice Voting, supporters of the “independent” commission used flowery language and promises of a more fair system to promote their effort. But their proposed solution does not address the entirety of the problem and has inherent problems too, which are now unfortunately codified into the state constitution, making future changes more difficult. The part of their proposal relevant to this conversation relates to subsection 13 of section 6, which states in relevant part;

 “(13) The commission shall abide by the following criteria in proposing and adopting each plan, in order of priority:

  (c) Districts shall reflect the state’s diverse population and communities of interest. Communities of interest may include, but shall not be limited to, populations that share cultural or historical characteristics or economic interests. Communities of interest do not include relationships with political parties, incumbents, or political candidates.

  (d) Districts shall not provide a disproportionate advantage to any political party. A disproportionate advantage to a political party shall be determined using accepted measures of partisan fairness.”

As we can see from subsections 13(c) and 13(d), the drawing of boundaries with these criteria in mind essentially ensures biased districts created around certain “communities of interest” on the one hand, neutered packed and cracked traditional political blocks on the other. The “independent” commission proposal did not end gerrymandering, it just shifted around the criteria (hiding it behind euphemisms), changing the decision-makers (unelected members potentially incompetent and influenced by outsiders) and codified it (into the Constitution with certain criteria required by law).

Every ten years, this “independent” commission must create and affirm new boundaries, and this may include deliberate actions that neutralize organic political shifts in certain areas. If this group of individuals is motivated by a desire to create boundaries that “shall not provide a disproportionate advantage to any political party,” as subsection 13(d) states, this effectively ensures a perpetual muddled-middle political community. Such a norm that includes a higher percentage of deliberately created middle-road districts encourages more weak candidates that are afraid to stand on principle, for fear of upsetting enough people to be voted out of office. Over time, this trend favors the status quo of unchecked perpetual government growth and irresponsible social decline because the only way to stop it is to run principled candidates that can rally the public to act to its contrary. The less of those types of candidates and citizens there are, the easier it is to slide by into a mediocre future guided by a bureaucratic autopilot favored by big-government Progressives and Leftists. This is unamercian. We must always remember, there is a solid set of ideals in America upon which to base our decisions, and that requires constant, vigilant, and principled defense. We are not first and foremost a “majority rules” nation; American Democracy values the will of the majority upon ensuring the fundamental rights of the minority and the Rule of Law are first upheld. It is much more difficult to explain this, nevermind get people to embrace it, than it is to appeal to their emotions and personal desires, thus the constant shift away from the former and towards the latter.

Considerations given our foundations and principles

Ranked Choice Voting changes may compliment this type of slow kill system by creating the same effect within the candidate selection process itself. Advocates of RCV, criticizing the current model of “first past the post” voting, state that it “makes elections toxic by incentivizing candidates to beat down their opponents and exaggerate differences, missing opportunities to reinforce areas of agreement that unify the electorate and create consensus for getting important things done after the election.” This is a nice way to say RCV will neuter genuine spirited debate and foster an artificial “good enough” attitude in the minds of candidates and the electorate alike.

This is not to say that initiating RCV methods would result in instant catastrophe. As indicated above, RCV, if the priorities of its major backers are considered, may be part of a long-game plan to slowly transform the American Constitutional Republic away from its rights-based, limited government, checks and balances foundations, towards a more easily manipulated “democratic” system of which certain political and ideological factions can take advantage. Focusing on local levels, such as the effort in Royal Oak, MI, is strategy. Vested interests are betting RCV will be advantageous to this end overall. Remember this when they list off all the other countries that use other social choice methods, including ranked choice voting. They may be a good fit for the “democracy” models of those nations, but America is uniquely oriented.

There may even be some instances where RCV would indeed function as advertised, for instance, allowing independent candidates in certain races to have a shot at winning an election they otherwise would have had no chance of winning in a two-party dominated system. But this depends on the specifics of the race and the subsequent rules of the jurisdiction among other factors. Most importantly, it would only be advantageous if the right third party candidates gain traction. As history has already shown, the opposite effect can also be true with RCV, as some races result in undesirable outcomes widely seen as unfair within the jurisdiction, especially due to the more complex process with more room for error and voter confusion. Many jurisdictions that initiated RCV later did away with it. Any voting system and method (including our current one) can be taken advantage of and/or abused; we should not automatically assume shifting to another one will solve the problem.

Those that are looking to Ranked Choice Voting as a major means towards fixing the problems with our electoral process, hyperpartisanship, voting access/fairness, candidate choice, and money in politics should probably be a bit more imaginative when it comes to assessing possible corruptions and exploitations within such a system. RCV is unlikely to end or even reduce such things. It is no easy task to do so. The added complexity of RCV does make errors more likely and some data shows it reduces turnout, indicating a potential threat to voter confidence. These types of problems could arguably be reduced or eliminated with time. The bigger issue though should be with the long-term impact, which may be the tendency for winning candidates to shift focus towards a less satisfactory middle ground that will influence all candidates and guide policy in a manner that risks contradicting our fundamental principles. We all want to create positive change in our communities, states, and nation, but the change ought to reflect principles which in turn influences the best candidates. We do not desire the opposite, which is to motivate candidates to sacrifice principles for electability or a false consensus that truly pleases very few among us. We already have enough of that as it is, normalizing social choice systems such as Ranked Choice Voting may add to the problem, not alleviate it.